

21 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Secretary Vance, 20 April 1967

1. I called on Mr. Vance in his office at 1600 hours, Thursday, 20 April and delivered Mr. Helms' letter of 19 April concerning the disposition of the "20 Questions" and the construction of a target oriented display of intelligence resources. I told Mr. Vance that Mr. Helms wanted to be completely clear about his attitude toward the target oriented display and for this reason asked me to deliver his letter personally to Mr. Vance so that I could answer any questions which might occur to him. Mr. Vance read the letter through and said that he agreed with it. I said that we recognize that the Defense Department had to take the initiative in the construction of the display of Defense Department resources. Obviously the data to be assembled has to come from programs which are normally compiled in three separate presentations. The development of a consolidated presentation inevitably involves cutting through established procedural and jurisdictional lines of authority. This can only be done under the authority of the Secretary of Defense. I pointed out, however, that the DCI has two basic and non-delegable responsibilities in this exercise. One is the statutory responsibility for the protection of sources and methods. The other is his responsibility for determining the objectives of the national intelligence effort. I said that this latter responsibility was obviously not exclusive. On the other hand, it seemed to me that he has the paramount responsibility for targeting intelligence activities.

2. Mr. Vance said that he was in complete agreement with these views. He did not seem to me overenthusiastic about this exercise or particularly optimistic that it would serve a particularly

useful purpose. At least he thought it would be a long time before anything significant came out of it. I told him that we would deal with Solis Horwitz on matters of policy and that I would assign some person or persons to deal directly with Herb Benington on matters relating to the construction of the display. (I have subsequently advised Horwitz, Benington and Bill Fischer of the BoB that Gerry Pettibone and Nathan Fitts would represent the DCI in this capacity.)

3. I said that I shared Mr. Vance's skepticism and that, while I believe that we should push for the target oriented display as vigorously as circumstances permit, we should simultaneously undertake an evaluation of particular areas which, because of their expense and/or importance, appear to warrant special examination. I pointed out that the purpose of a display is to reveal imbalances in the total program effort or areas of overlap, etc. A good many of these are pretty obvious already and, in my opinion, should be the subject of immediate examination. It was for this reason, I said, that we had put forward the "20 Questions." I also said that I had had several conversations with General Carroll about the necessity for studies of discrete areas of intelligence activity, such as the effort against the Soviet ICBM program, etc. Mr. Vance agreed that we should go ahead with this kind of thing.

4. Mr. Vance said that he had just received the Davis Report from Al Flax and wondered whether I had read it. I said that I had not and that I was concerned about the ABM problem as a test of the ability of the intelligence community to launch a concerted and efficient effort against a really important target. I said I hoped that this problem might indeed serve as a catalyst to help improve the organizational arrangements in the community to plan and program the activity against this kind of target. The Davis Report, I said, was concerned with only one element of the problem, although a very important one, and that was the overhead coverage. Mr. Vance said that he had instructed Flax and Larsen to brief him on the totality of the effort and the relative effectiveness of land based, as well as space, coverage. I said that I hoped he would include us in any discussions of this character. The real problem seemed to me to be to identify the specific targets which were accessible to various types of collection activity and identify the means of coverage most likely to afford coverage of a particular target. As an example, I mentioned the problem of the engagement radar signal, the precise value of which as an indication of ABM activity still seems to be in some doubt.

5. I said that I thought the program review procedures now in effect, at least as regards CIA, the CCP and the CIP, were working well and had been carried about as far as they could go. I doubted whether any substantial improvement in the procedures relating to these reviews was possible. I expressed some reservation about the NRP however, and pointed out that the NRP is not given anything like the searching scrutiny to which other large intelligence programs are subjected. I said that it was obviously important to maintain to some degree the informality with which reconnaissance programs are discussed and approved. On the other hand, I thought that the program would benefit from review through somewhat more formal procedures.

6. Finally, Mr. Vance reverted to his conversation with the Director and Admiral Taylor about the need for a very searching and critical review of our ground based intelligence facilities. The Secretary of Defense was present at this meeting and personally emphasized his interest in the problem. His basic concern continues to be with the fact that our relations with such nations as Turkey, Pakistan and Ethiopia can be distorted by considerations relating to the presence of intelligence facilities on their territory. Mr. Vance indicated that they would be prepared to pay additional money in order to avoid the necessity of maintaining intelligence facilities in foreign countries. We discussed the problem posed by the need of overseas commands for tactical and early warning intelligence facilities. I assured Mr. Vance that we had already undertaken a review of the take and objectives of overseas collection facilities and would develop some conclusions about the purposes and importance of these activities and the cost and relative effectiveness of alternatives.

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